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The Mask and Agamben: the Transitional
Juridical Technics of Legal Relation
Connal Parsley1
Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben is well known for his complex
critique of the institution and praxis of thought in the west, and in
particular for taking aim at a constellation of ontologico-political
structures denoted by the term ‘ juridical’. Within this endeavour,
Agamben provides a critique of the metaphysical subject and of the
related notion of the person. Specifically, for Agamben the figure of
the human is structured and produced by the dignitas: the image or
mask which bridges the juridical, moral or ‘natural’ person, and the
condition of their appearance within law and political life. As he wrote
in a recent collection of essays: ‘Persona originally means “mask” and
it is through the mask that the individual acquires a role and a social
identity’ (2009c: 71). The tradition of thinking the person from the
direction of the mask and its categories of appearance is a long one,
and it is marked by a tightly sedimented correlation between these
two senses — metaphysical-moral and politico-juridical — of the
‘person’. Within that tradition, the mask or persona is a technic — a
device, dispositif or apparatus — through which a juridical relation
to life comes to be engendered.2 For example, in Roberto Esposito’s
terms, the generalisation of the metaphysics of the ‘person’ means
nothing less than the ‘juridical governability of becoming in its norms
and exceptions’ (Esposito 1999: 240).3 Rather than address the many
strands and variegations of this rich and complex tradition, and rather
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than trace either Agamben’s broader stance on government, juridicality
and life or its interaction with his specific development of Foucault’s
term dispositif,4 in this brief article my interest is in identifying and
establishing something quite specific about Giorgio Agamben’s strategy
for thinking the person as a mask.
In order to do this, I argue that in Hobbes — a key referent in
Agamben’s account of political power’s relation to life — the (political)
mask, with its antecedent in Cicero’s theatrical metaphor, is an essential,
indeed indispensable element of an account of political representation:
a device which always mediates a rhetorically foregrounded natural
life through and against the realm of human (political) artifice.
Many authors have attempted to cultivate a non-theatrical or nonrepresentational register of the political in response to this feature of
contemporary political discourse.5 I would suggest that Agamben is
among them. But perhaps surprisingly, Agamben — despite famously
critiquing Hobbes’ representative politics and sovereign power, and
the notion of natural life which belongs to and sustains it — cannot be
said to negate the politico-legal technic of the mask/persona outright. I
argue that Agamben instead effects a delicate separation of the juridical
relation from the specific, material technics which precede and facilitate
it — the same technics which provide it with its ‘origin’6 — ultimately
using a transformed or ‘perfected’ version of that legal technic against
juridical relations. In this case, I will argue that Agamben refines the
tradition of thinking the person as a mask, a species of image, and,
resisting its substantialisation in the moral person, deploys it against
the image/substance caesura of modern politics.

Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated
In the Leviathan, for the first time in his theory of government, Thomas
Hobbes introduces a discussion of the nature of the political person.
Hitherto framing the political covenant according to a relatively
mechanistic operation of exchange — an agreement to subject oneself
and to relinquish rights (Skinner 2005: 168) — in Leviathan, Hobbes
deploys a vocabulary of author and authorisation, representative and
13
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representation, person and personation (Hobbes 1968: 217-22). Hobbes’
discussion constitutes a critically significant intertwining of the two
major dimensions of the modern political person: on the one hand, the
juridical, ethical self capable of covenanting, authoring, authorising,
and of holding property (Hobbes 1968: 218); and on the other, that
self ’s ‘outward appearance’ — the visible, countable entity which is
necessary to the formation of ‘the Representative’ and, more specifically,
to the accountancy of affirmative and negative voices by which its will
is determined (Hobbes 1968: 221).

For Hobbes, the category ‘person’ serves as the mediation and
relation between these two poles, and his notion of the person is strongly
influenced by Cicero’s parallel between speaking or acting for another,
and the actor’s ‘bearing’ or ‘sustaining’ a mask or persona which had,
by the early Middle Ages, already become a standard sense of the term
repraesentare. As Hobbes sets out:
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have
πρóσωπον, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the
disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and
sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face,
as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any
Representer of speech and action, as well as in Tribunalls, as Theatres.
So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the stage and in
common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act¸ or Represent himselfe,
or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or
act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it … (Hobbes 1968: 217).
Hobbes cultivates his category of the person through the technical
device of the mask which, by an application of Cicero’s parallel between
the theatrical stage and the tribunal, serves as well for portraying
someone’s appearance as it does for speaking in their name. The mask
thus generalises the phenomena of personation, acting, and representation
across the theatrical and legal scenes. In fact, it is the discussion of these
processes in Hobbes’ chapter, ‘Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things
personated ’, that grounds the very juridical notion of the authoring/
authorising person, the covenanting individual, and the nature of
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ownership in general. What must therefore be grasped in Hobbes’
discussion of representation and the person is that it establishes an
indissoluble relation between the creation of a fictional representation,
to which is attributed a Leviathan’s power, and the juridical notions of
the person in relation to authorship and authority. The mask or ‘persona’,
as an avowed ‘Fiction’ of political appearance, is the practical imagetechnic which comes to emblematise a juridical relation in mediating
between an abstract, political metaphor of organisation on the one
hand, and a notion of nature and the natural person on the other —
thus enabling the former on the basis of the latter.

Hobbes’ account of the person, it is sometimes noted, works with
a relatively stable and atomistic, and certainly pre-social, notion of the
individual. The idea of an individual agent who acts self-interestedly,
guided into a social and political covenant by fear and self-preservation,
implies in Hobbes an individualist distinction of self from social or
political role (Hollis 1985: 226). In order to show that this is entirely
consistent with a political self which is understood as inseparable from
the technical fiction of the mask, I intend to describe in some detail of the
tradition of thinking the mask and the social self together in a persona.

Πρóσωπον, Persona, Person
Marcel Mauss, commenting that the Schools of Athens and Rhodes
had tremendous influence on Latin moral thought, remarks that
πρóσωπον did indeed quite precisely translate as persona — and that
in Latin the term retains the seemingly paradoxical duality which is
of interest to us here. This duality consists in its meaning as a ‘mask’
and, at the same time, as the character each individual ‘is and aspires
to be’. As he wrote:
The word πρóσωπον is extended to the individual, with his nature
laid bare and every mask torn away, and, nevertheless, there is retained
the sense of the artificial: the sense of what is the innermost nature
of this ‘person’ (personne), and the sense of what is the ‘role-player’
(personnage) (Mauss 1985: 18).
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This fundamental confusion can be seen in greater detail in one of
the best-known texts from the classical tradition, Cicero’s De Officiis.
In this case, it takes the form of an inability to articulate a set of ethical
requirements or duties without recourse to the notion of a personal
image of virtue. The problem goes far beyond the fact that the ethicality
of character or action is, in Cicero, far from absolute — referable almost
entirely to one’s role and status. Rather, virtue itself appears to have the
very form of an image or the presentation of a ‘face’. According to the
strict relation in Cicero between personae and ‘mere images of virtue
[simulacra virtutis]’ (Burchell 1998:114), it appears to be enough for
Cicero to ‘represent’ or ‘act’ a virtuous part and be seen to be performing
it. But it must be noted that this is not tantamount to a cynical politicotheatrical performance by an otherwise coherently separable (im)moral
actor because, as Burchell remarks, ‘it is far from clear that Cicero would
be able to make sense of this kind of distinction’ (1998: 116). The very
notion of an individual’s nature underlying their public acts is defined
only through further embedded gradations of the persona. Specifically,
Cicero remarks that like actors, we must each undertake the difficult
tasks of evaluating our natures, impulses and talents and matching them
to the most appropriate persona in the interests of creating a seemly
‘evenness’ which serves an ideal of civil decorum:
Cicero’s invocation of ‘one’s own nature’ is not so much an observation
of ‘personality’ as an invocation of the ethical notion of ‘character’
familiar from the Greco-Roman stage, from whence the term persona
had emerged into wider usage (Burchell 1998: 111-12).

Here, the ‘nature’ of one’s character, lurking beneath the social
presentation of a seemly self, is defined only by further reference to
a visible, demonstrable and performable self endowed with specific
theatrical character-features like ‘wit’ or ‘patience’ (Burchell 1998:
112-13).

Despite its service within a different political context, a similar
primacy of the representation (and concomitant indistinction between
the ‘artificial’ and the ‘natural’ person) can be found in Hobbes’
Leviathan. In fact, the personated entity is presented in Hobbes as the
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very principle of a confusion between the natural person and the human
capacity for art or artifice. Leviathan opens with the proclamation that
‘Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is
by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated,
that it can make an Artificial Animal’ (Hobbes 1968: 81). Offering
nature itself as species of art, Hobbes prepares the ground for the feat
of politically natural representation he was about to unfold. And when
it comes to Hobbes’ explicit claims about the mask and the persona,
he makes no material distinction between presenting oneself ‘Truly’,
or representing someone else, ‘by Fiction’ (1986: 217): a point which
did not escape the notice of Hannah Pitkin in her classic study (1967:
19). In either of these cases, the theatrical mask, inherited from Cicero,
enables Hobbes to make no distinction between ‘Natural ’ and ‘Artificial ’
personhood. In fact, in the quotation above, Hobbes installs the
primacy of ‘disguise’ and ‘outward appearance’ into his every notion of
the person, whether in artificial or natural conversation — concluding,
as he does, that ‘a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage
and in common Conversation’. Further, he affirms that to ‘Personate is
to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other, and he that acteth another, is
said to beare his Person’ (1998: 217). To the lack of distinction between
conversation and staged speech, we may therefore add an indifference
to ‘acting’ or ‘representing’ oneself or another: in each case, what is
primary is the mask of personhood which must undoubtedly be worn
in order to appear and to figure in the political landscape; and it is to
this mask that juridical rights accrue (see Pitkin 1967: 19). It is this
same precondition, when read with Hobbes’ collocated discussion of
the principle of author and authority (with its Roman and Christian
antecedents), which enables not just the ability, but precisely the authority to handle the juridical and covenanting self — whether one’s own
or that of another. That is, the very juridical and ‘substantial’ self is
expressed as a species of persona: mask, image, artifice, representation.
This dependence of the substantial on the technical is less surprising
than it might seem. In fact, Hobbes’ pre-social atomistic individual
owes a great deal, in the first place, to the notion of the ‘moral person’
fashioned by Christianity — a person posited, as Marcel Mauss said in
17
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a famous essay (relying on Schlossman), as a ‘metaphysical entity’ and,
eventually, a sacred and inalienable core of personhood (Mauss 1985:
19, 22). However, the origins of this entity are to be found in none
other than the very notion of the ‘mask’ which is at issue. As Giorgio
Agamben notes, referring to Boethius (who knowingly ‘hypostasised’
and substantialised the theatrical sense of the persona), the Church
Fathers’ theologico-metaphysical notion of person rested on the very
basis of a ‘double semantic heredity of the term “person”, which …
signifies both “mask” and juridico-moral “personality”’ (Agamben
1996: 18).
This originary confusion, which enabled the stabilisation of a
metaphysical personhood, can therefore be seen as a co-implication
of ‘nature’ (or the natural) and the ‘artificial’, to the point where it is
impossible to rigorously separate them. This problematic co-implication,
present in the Greek notion of πρóσωπον, remains operative not only
in the reception of the Greek into the Latin persona, but also, I argue,
in the subsequently crafted juridical self of modern political theology
— and certainly in Hobbes’ Leviathan. And it is to Agamben’s response
to this co-implication that I turn presently.
Before doing so, it is necessary to make one further note about
Hobbes’ person in order to make clear the political horizon of this
co-implicative structure. It concerns the essentiality of representation,
or a ‘vicariousness’ to that notion of the person, which was invested
deeply in both Hobbes’ view of the political person and his project
for its organisation. Since, in Hobbes, personation itself is acting for
or representing ‘the self or another’, the vicariousness that comes to
structure the authority and appearance of identity is permitted to
permeate the structure of the political self itself. This representative
mechanism is absolutely necessary to Hobbes’ treatise, as it is only
because of the primariness of the representability of the self (over
the substance that is represented) that the Leviathan may have
one of its most distinguishing and, at the same time, controversial
features: it is a single ‘personified’ figure and not a parliamentary body
corresponding proportionately to a populace (see Skinner 2005: 173;
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Schmitt 1996a: 32-4; and Gamboni’s (2005) discussion of composite
images). Thus the Leviathan’s legitimacy, and even possibility, rests for
Hobbes on this feature. The ‘natural’ identity which is pre-supposed
by Hobbes’ structure, therefore, entertains a difficult relation with its
own representation; fundamentally ranked behind ‘representativeness’
(Skinner 2005: 173), but essential to it in rhetorically guaranteeing its
authority.

The political problem of representation has received many and
varying treatments — especially within critical twentieth century
thought of Modernity7 — and, within this history, the work of Hobbes
in particular (which Esposito has said ‘opens the history of radical
imminence’ (1999: 82)) has left much to be discussed.8 Even though,
as Pitkin’s analysis shows, the problem of representation requires the
careful itemisation of its various senses and difficulties; and even though
any detailed consideration of the nature and problem of representation
cannot help but encompass countless other thematics; I wish to take
up only a specific aspect of its legacy. It is an aspect that belongs to
many traditions of juridical thought, not specifically to Hobbes, and it
is more visible than ever in contemporary legal discourses of the person
in general. I refer to the fact that just as in Hobbes the natural political
personality is modelled on and pre-supposed by the artificial devices of
its representation, so too does the same structure (a primary positivity
or representation supported by a pre-supposed and supposedly preexisting personal entity) characterise law’s person. It is useful to reiterate
this apparently trivial point — often made, for example, regarding the
nature of the disembodied corporation — because of the radicality of
the critique to which, I will now suggest, it is subjected by Giorgio
Agamben.9 I therefore note, briefly, a basic feature of modern thought
of the legal person which traces this Hobbesian pattern. While all
moderns might agree with Richard Tur’s Kelsenian suggestion that ‘[i]
f legal personality is the legal capacity to bear rights and duties, then it
is itself an artificial creation of the law’ (Tur 1987: 121); with the result
that personality is determinative of the exercise of and participation
in legal power; it is also the case that such a formal entity presupposes
a relation to an independently existing life. This life, however, takes
19
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the form of a consistent juridical entity also called the ‘person’ which,
whether or not recognised as ‘moral’ as such, is certainly a stable
metaphysical entity whose juridicality is again being reaffirmed by its
endowment with natural rights (with or without legal recognition).
Further, it is frequently supposed that such a personated life is prior
to its reflection by the formal technics of the law (the opposite, based
on our discussion above, is historically the case).10

Legal discourse is structured according to a positive and formal
mask of personality that nevertheless relies upon the image of a ‘flesh
and blood’ natural life (potentially ‘without law’) which underlies and
animates it. No clearer example could be found than this emblematic
quotation from John Thomas Noonan’s (1976) Persons and Masks of
the Law which, while acknowledging the absolute prevalence of the
fictions of legal personality, fantasises about an underlying natural
reality without law:
In the making of masks lawyers have let their fiction-making capacity
run amok ... masks are monsters as dangerous as those issuing from
the sleep of rational rule. Masks are a type of ‘human self-alienation’.
Masks conceal persons. To remove the masks is to distinguish between
them and the persons. By the latter I mean particular flesh and blood
and consciousness (Noonan 1976: 26).

The great variety of positions on the legal subject may emphasise
either the formal features of the legal subject or a natural personal
substance (or ‘reasonable person’) lying under or within it (see, for
example, Naffine 2003; Davies and Naffine 2001). But, in fact, both of
these positions remain complicit in the tradition of the person which
begins with the mask but in doing so posits that the mask is borne by
some real-life wearer — precisely the point against which Agamben’s
analysis strikes.
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Imago Sacer
I have noted that Agamben is concerned to critique the juridical person
pre-supposed by the tradition I have outlined here. But leaving aside
for a moment the critical interventions of his project, it is useful to
briefly establish the role of the political mask or persona within the
descriptive and diagnostic dimension of his writing. I argue that
Agamben identifies a primacy of the personal political appearance of
Hobbesian heritage (although he does so, as will be seen shortly, in
order to overcome the constitutive presupposition of nature which it
necessitates). There is perhaps no clearer example of Agamben’s account
of the importance of the persona as a political mask or imago than the
crucial passage of Homo Sacer (1995) in which Agamben discusses
Kantorowicz’s famous thesis of the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ (Agamben
1995: 91-103). As useful and important as Kantorowicz’s work is for
our understanding of the dual nature of political personality and the
function of the image in political theology generally (see particularly
Kantorowicz 1946, 1957), my intention here is not to extol the
indispensability to political theology of the person-as-image generally;
but rather to identify the specific and unusual approach Agamben
takes to it. I therefore read Agamben’s discussion, which emphasises a
fundamental similarity between the apotheosis of the Roman emperors
and Kantorowicz’s description of the funeral rites of French kings, as
notable for two principal reasons, which I will address in turn.
Firstly, it is striking that in Agamben’s analysis it is precisely
the image of the King or Emperor, theatrically tended and given
ritual burial, that is the unifying, politically significant element in
both the Roman and French instances of the drama of maintaining
perpetual sovereign power. Agamben, insisting that ‘what is decisive
for understanding the whole ritual is precisely the function and nature
of the image’ (1995: 95), argues that the:
… macabre and grotesque rite in which an image was first treated as a
living person and then solemnly burned gestured ... toward a darker and
more uncertain zone ... in which the political body of the king seemed
to approximate — and even to become indistinguishable from — the
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body of homo sacer, which can be killed but not sacrificed (1995: 94).

What turns out to constitute the hinge between the central, originary
relation at stake in Homo Sacer — the fundamental relation between
sovereignty and the sacredness of a bare political life conditioning every
political subjectivity — is nothing other than the public or political
body, which has the form of an image. After considering the funereal
mask, Agamben demonstrates the commonality to all political power
of this technic or device by showing that is it in fact the image of the
devotus (a citizen or warrior consecrated to the gods) that is the sacrally
and politically active ingredient. Initially suggesting that an analogy
between the devotus and homo sacer seems only superficial (consisting
in their being both consecrated to death and thus belonging to the
gods), Agamben again presses home a closer relation, this time to be
found in Livy. And again, it is the image as public and sacred persona
which constitutes the parallel:
If the man who has been consecrated dies, it is deemed that all is well;
but if he does not die, then an image [signum] of him must be buried
seven feet or more under the ground and a victim must be immolated
in expiation. And no Roman magistrate may walk over the ground in
which the image has been buried. But if he has consecrated himself
... and if he does not die, he cannot perform any rite, either public or
private (Livy, in Agamben 1995: 97).

According to the guiding principles of Livy’s remark, it is the
representation, the image or likeness of the body (it does not matter
whether living or dead), which is the part of us ‘subject’ to political
power and is, as Agamben says, consecrated to death, separated from the
‘living’ (1995: 100). Since sacred life is ‘isolated in the image’ (1995: 101),
the ‘bare life’ to which that image referred or represented is permitted
to live on, invisibly to the gods, without the mask that guarantees it a
place in political life, sacral efficacy, community, power and genealogy.
It is therefore possible to remark that there could be no ‘bare life’ in
Agamben’s book without this technic of the mask or the image; in its
various historical iterations as the wax figure, the colossus, the ‘double’,
the statue, the funereal image or doll, the larvae or, as I will discuss
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shortly, the dignitas. It is the generalised logic of these chronologically
disparate material political techniques which, for Agamben, ‘seems to
unite, in one constellation, the body of the sovereign and the body of
the devotee’ (1995: 97).

The second decisive aspect of this passage is that this discussion
occurs in the context of an attempt to correct a perplexing omission
in the work of both Kantorowicz and, subsequently, his pupil Gisey,
on a matter with direct bearing on the broader question of the relation
between theology and politics. Whereas scholars had overtly related
the Roman precedent to the French funeral rites, Kantorowicz excludes
this possibility for the purpose, Agamben maintains, of preserving his
‘thesis concerning “Christian political theology”’ (Agamben 1995:94).
Of course, it is important to Agamben to establish in Homo Sacer the
generalisability of the sacred relation inherent in sovereign political
power. This is an organising contention which receives important
updates in more recent writings, such as the conviction that the
secularised world does not escape the theological but bears its mark
(Agamben 2009a: 76), and that the sacred relation survives this process
and must be ‘profaned’ rather than simply secularised (see Agamben
2007a). Absolutely critical to grasp in this regard is that, for Agamben,
it is none other than the image-mask which coheres this possibility;
and in his subsequent revisions of Kantorowicz’s thesis, for example
in State of Exception and Il Regno e la Gloria, this aspect is emphasised
in different idioms. In the former, Agamben explains that it is only
because the King’s power was so bound to his person or personality (as
auctoritas, distinct from potestas), that the need arose to preserve it in a
dignitas or image that does not die (‘dignitas non moratur’) (Agamben
2005a: 83); even going so far as to declare that dignitas is ‘simply a
synonym for auctoritas’ (2005a: 83). And in the latter, Agamben revisits
Kantorowicz’s (1946) claims in order to declare that the glorification of
power, achieved through its depiction and liturgical acclamation (this,
too, with its origins in a pagan equivalent), has a constitutive and not
merely descriptive function in maintaining the life of perpetual and
absolute power. Thus, Agamben is able to situate glorification effected
through depiction and acclamation as ‘more originary — or rather,
23
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more decisive — than the distinction between theology and politics,
spiritual or profane power’, it being, rather, the praxis and the empty,
bodiless clothing ‘in which they coincide’ (Agamben 2007b: 215).

Therefore, for Agamben, the image-mask is a critical hinge in
his description of the symbology of perpetual and absolute sovereign
power: it not only coordinates the relation between sovereign and sacred
body, but it also constitutes the tie uniting diverse historical epochs
which are characterised by otherwise different forms of power. That
is, the cipher of the ‘mask’ bears immanently within it a specific form
of political relation which would need to be ‘profaned’ rather than
simply secularised.

Dignitas
A brief mention of Agamben’s most frequently deployed determination
of the political persona, the dignitas, will help us to more overtly
connect Agamben’s handling of that person to the tradition which, I
have suggested, is compressed into Hobbes’ Leviathan. What is at stake
is the certainty that, for Agamben, the notion of the external, visible
political self is not merely some technical legal exercise that facilitates
formal or procedural relations. For Agamben, who despite striking
against juridico-normativity in its most pervasive forms concerns
himself so very rarely with any strictly so-called ‘legal’ phenomena and
positivities, it is the very institution and tradition of thought, rather than
a positively distinct entity ‘law’, which above all accommodates and
organises the sacro-juridical logics he targets.11 This complex idea has
an easily comprehensible consequence for my discussion here.

The mask of personhood carries within it a responsibility that is
both moral and juridical (Agamben 2009c: 80). Simply, it is not strictly
necessary to address a ‘properly legal’ account of legal personality
in order to find a juridically structured person, since the mask of
personhood itself is a device which immanently bears with it a juridical
caesura and relation. This can be seen antonomastically in his account
of the notion of dignitas which, as in the traditions with which the first
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part of this paper are concerned, does not permit an easy separation
between the natural person and a political artifice of personhood. For
example, in Remnants of Auschwitz, in the course of his suggestion that
existing concepts of ethics (and ‘dignity’) are fundamentally juridical
in nature, Agamben traces dignitas through Roman public law’s notion
of rank and ‘external appearance’, through its spiritualisation by moral
philosophy, to the point where it is made to function coterminously with
the juridical person and the very figure of the human (Agamben 2002:
66-9). And, as I mentioned above, Agamben’s decisive handling of the
distinction between the powers of auctoritas and potestas characterises
the former as coterminous with dignitas.

This pervasiveness of the (fleshed) person by the original maskstructure means that what is clearly present within Agamben’s account
is the continual identification of a theological caesura, rather than a
simple difference, between the natural and political person. As he writes
in The End of the Poem, after remarking on the dual sense of ‘person’ as
both ‘theatrical mask’ and ‘moral personality’; ‘after the Fall, person and
nature remain — tragically or comically — divided and will coincide
again on the “last day” of the resurrection of the flesh’ (Agamben
1996: 19). But this is no simple division or separation. The subject
of Agamben’s critique is a double gesture which stabilises throughout
the Western tradition of theologico-philosophical constructions
of the person. This gesture consists on the one hand of creating a
parallel between the theatrical and the juridical, and arguing for
their conflation; and on the other, in doing so, maintaining a division
between the persona and the natura which is presupposed as the natural
substance to which it attaches, a double gesture which founds both
the juridical and moral person together (see Agamben, 2009c: 72).
The Church Fathers’ establishment of the metaphysical person on the
notion of the mask was, after all, reliant on reference to a ‘natura that
is its subiecta and without which it cannot subsist’ (Agamben 1999: 19).
The history of the metaphor of the mask thus engenders the split
in the modern subject, with a specific consequence for the figuration
of a natural life said to underlie it. Glossed in Remnants of Auschwitz
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as the ‘simultaneous separation and unity of dignity and its bodily
bearer’ (Agamben 2002: 67), the ‘person’ is complicit in producing and
maintaining the spectre of a nature, hiding behind the mask of nomos,
without which the theatre of valid power would be ineffective. As such,
what is operative here is the further specification of the problem of
bare life: the natural life that is produced by the political relation and
bound to it, but separated from it by a caesura (see Agamben 1995).

The Mask and Non-Representational Politics
In order to appreciate the subtlety of the critical move Agamben makes
in response to this diagnosis, it is useful to note Hollis’ affirmation with
regard to the status of the mask as persona in Hobbes. Hollis (1985)
remarks that the so-called natural core, the ‘actor’ themselves behind
the mask, if there is one, is utterly inaccessible since the mask comes
to stand in for the totality of the social, the system, the public, and
everything legitimate. What results for Hollis is a ‘Hobbesian core so
private and so much at a distance from its public, legitimating masks
that the real man is impenetrable, it vanishes from scientific enquiry’
(Hollis 1985: 227). And it is this feature to which Agamben directs
his now very familiar discussion in Homo Sacer: for example, when he
says that ‘the state of nature is ... not truly external to nomos but rather
contains its virtuality’ (Agamben 1995: 35). This aspect of Agamben’s
critique of the caesura within juridical thought is extremely important.
It relates to another key strand in the introductory passages of Homo
Sacer, namely, the notion that just as law presupposes ‘life’ or ‘nature’,
so too ‘language presupposes the non-linguistic as that with which it
must maintain itself in a virtual relation’ (1995: 20); thus giving rise to
the negative metaphysics which binds language to death and placemarks
the subject’s separation from (and within) historical time.
Although structurally delicate, the departure of Agamben’s critical
project from Hobbes’ political one is abrupt. It must be recalled that
what was primary for Hobbes was the deployment of the technic
device of the mask as the cipher of a split between a person’s external,
representable political identity, and its ultimately unrepresentable natural
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centre. And further, that it is precisely this split which enables the
political mechanism of the Leviathan to function. The technic of the
mask is clearly oriented in Hobbes towards the establishment of a
politically perpetual and absolute sovereign power, and for that reason
it must constitute a dangerous device for Agamben, whose critical
project aims not only to critique that power, but also to articulate the
conditions of the thought, possibility and politicality of its overcoming.
This commitment, like almost all important aspects of Agamben’s work,
undergoes many iterations across disciplinary terrains — beginning
with the critique of language and negative metaphysics in Language and
Death (1991) and Infancy and History (2007c). While this problematic
cannot be discussed in any detail here, the argument I offer regarding
Agamben’s approach to the ‘mask’ is an example (rather than an
explanation) of Agamben’s particular non-representational approach.
In order to grasp this argument it is worth recalling Agamben’s attempt
to articulate a conception of politics that does not entail a notion of
representation.12 In The Coming Community (1993a) and Means Without
End (2000) particularly, Agamben affirms that to found a community
on the ‘representable’ predicates of its members (members hitherto split
by the caesura seen in Hobbes) only ensures the political community’s
constitution by a negative and exclusionary semiotic logic of difference
and similitude which does not address the originary human ethos and
capacity for politics. Agamben, therefore, emphasises the need for a
non-identitarian political belonging or community and attempts to
articulate politics as a question of our ability to ‘form a community
without claiming an identity’, thus affirming that ‘human beings cobelong without a representable condition of belonging’.
For these reasons, it is perhaps surprising to read Agamben’s account
of the legacy of comedy left to Italian culture by Dante in The End of the
Poem (1996), which was published after Homo Sacer and only a couple
of years before Remnants of Auschwitz’s account of dignitas, person, and
the theatrical mask. It is there that Agamben outlines the Stoic critique
of tragedy and remarks that, for the Stoics, only a truly tragic person
would make the error of confusing themselves, their identity, with the
mask they have been assigned by fate. As he describes, for Epictetus
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‘the wise man is instead the one who, accepting without discussion
whatever “mask” has been assigned to him by fate, represents his part
and thereby refuses to identify with it’ (Agamben 1999: 17-18). A basis
for virtue in Stoic thought thus emerges from the acceptance of one’s
‘role’ and, at the same time, the holding apart of one’s natural person
(however conceived) from the political person (see Agamben 2009c:
73). But however logical and tempting it might seem, on the basis of
Agamben’s thoroughgoing critique of the confusion of artifice and
nature in Hobbes, it must not be supposed that Agamben endorses
this ‘holding apart’ in an attempt to mirror the Stoics’ safe and cynical
distance from the technic of the mask. The Stoic position does not
neutralise (or ‘profane’) the technic at issue. On the contrary, it was
only because of this distance that something like a moral personality
could emerge, a category which Agamben regards as the ‘power that
furnishes criteria for action and that remains superior to all the possible
acts it can produce’ (1999: 18). For Agamben, a conscious, cynical,
Stoic distance from the mask (dependent as it must be on precisely
the institution of thought which is pervaded by a juridical heritage)
is only emblematic of the two poles of that moral personhood — a
personhood which was always constituted ‘through an adhesion, and
at the same time, a disjuncture with respect to the social mask’ (2009c:
73). In fact, I will now argue that Agamben ought to be regarded as
undertaking the gesture precisely opposing that of the Stoics; which
is to say, paradoxically not negating, nor taking a distance from, the
very technic of the mask which enabled the formation of the juridical
person to begin with.

‘Be only your face’
First of all, it is instructive to look at the fate which Agamben allocates
to dignitas in the ‘camp’. Since, as is well-known, the camp is for
Agamben the paradigmatic example of the coextensivity of the juridical
norm with modern political space, the fate of dignitas in the camp is
significant for Agamben’s approach to it generally. Whereas dignitas, as
we have seen, borrows the foundational metaphor of a mask concealing
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a separate natural person and incorporates it as a spectral faultline in
modern ethical subjectivity, Agamben argues that this binds the moral
notion of human dignity to an external political appearance and a
concomitantly structured (and presupposed) ‘humanness’. So, according
to Agamben, everything resembling ‘human dignity’ as a ‘humane’ and
‘dignified’ treatment and experience of the person is precisely what is
lost (and yet ‘witnessed’) in Auschwitz. As he remarks, in a manner
which clearly poses a bond between the thought of ethical standards and
the thought and positivity of normative juridical structures, ‘Auschwitz
marks the end and the ruin of every ethics of dignity and conformity to
a norm’ (2002: 69). As such, for Agamben, any ‘good’ that the camp’s
survivors are able to ‘save from the camp’ is ‘therefore not dignity’. It
must not be thought, however, that the loss of the image of dignity
means that there is revealed a true kernel of natural life underneath.
Such a life is only the bare life that dignity creates, which is structured
and implicated, as we have seen, juridically. What is at stake is actually
the disappearance of both this figure of bare life and dignity together:
… in extreme situations ... it is not possible to maintain even the
slightest distance between real person and model, between life and
norm. And this is not because life or the norm, the internal or the external,
in turn takes the upper hand. It is rather because they are inseparable
at every point (Agamben 2002: 69, italics added).

The fusion of juridico-normal and personal life — and of everything
internal (unrepresentable) and external (predicable), at the moment of
its terrible and perfect fusion — consumes the image-dignitas which
created the poles of its caesura and is converted into a ‘form-of-life’.
For this reason, as well as being a destruction of all notions structuring
ethical life as hitherto thought, it is also a kind of new and uncertain
possible ground for an ethical life conceived apart from dignitas, which
Agamben suggests would be the precondition of a more originary
human ethos and political existence (Agamben 2002: 69). While
Agamben’s account of the possibility of this non-juridical ethical life
is well known, my particular concern is to demonstrate that it consists
precisely in the possibility of this fusion (not separation) of appearance
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and person; politico-legal mask and natural being. I therefore turn to
key moments within his work where such a fusion is attempted.

Chief among these is found in Means Without End (2000), in which
Agamben’s essay on ‘the face’ (which was originally published in the
same year as Homo Sacer) presents, I argue, an attempt to disable the
juridical (and Hobbesian) ‘personal’ split between the internal and
external;13 a communicable, representable, social and external imageidentity on the one hand, and an unsayable, unrepresentable, private,
natural and internal self on the other (Agamben 2000: 91-100). In
arguing that the face is actually only the cipher of the appropriation
of the living being by means of (juridical) language, Agamben casts
the face as at once a kind of extreme ‘zero-point’ of the capture and
presupposition of the natural being by the linguistic structures of
signification and, at the same time, a potentially transformative
exposure of that process. Thus, the face, the appearance of the person,
functions as an ambivalent location for two paradigms of politics. And
for Agamben, this exposure to language and to politics is capable of
engendering a political life more originary than one premised on any
representable predicate within our identities — a basis critiqued also in
The Coming Community (see Agamben 1993a: 1). As he remarks, ‘that
which in single individuals opens up to the political is the tragicomedy
of truth’ (2000: 91).
This reference to the tragic and comic masks is not trivial. It
was always the mask that coordinated the external-internal caesura
between persona and natura which marks representable-unrepresentable
personated life; and the face (since every identity is for Agamben a
mask) is also the threshold between these two poles. This very threshold
is the point of collapse between personated and natural life; the point
at which one’s internal qualities or ‘predicates’ interface with the world;
the ‘threshold of de-propriation and of de-identification of all manners
and of all qualities — a threshold in which only the latter become purely
communicable’ (Agamben 2000: 100). This is why he exhorts us to
dwell, somehow, where nothing in us can be predicated: ‘Be only your
face,’ he writes, ‘Go to the threshold. Do not remain the subjects of
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your properties or faculties, do not stay beneath them: rather, go with
them, in them, beyond them’ (Agamben 2000: 100).

Agamben therefore begins from the point, which we identified
in Hobbes, of a primary confusion between nature and art, between
the guise and the disguise; between the genuine person and the
artificial or represented one. But whereas Hobbes, pursuing a politics
of representation, could at no cost follow through on the potential
erasure of the object of representation — the ‘natural self ’ or ‘natural
life’ which is necessary to make sense of and validate the economy of
representations — Agamben undertakes precisely this move. Whereas
the modern positivist conception of the subject, however formal,
repeats the gesture of a separation between mask and wearer, image
and natural referent, Agamben – passing through that conception –
attempts their dissolution. The problem with the instituted juridical
metaphor of the mask, Agamben seems to suggest, is precisely that
it is only metaphorical, thus concealing the fact that the mask, the
appearance, is the only self.
What I wish to suggest is that Agamben’s strategy — rather than
insisting on the sanctity of a space away from representability — is
to ‘appropriate this appropriation’ and situate life within it, thus
engendering a genuine inseparability of person and appearance, inside
and outside, in which a person is only their face, only their mask, only
their image.

Ruin: Perfection / Collapse
If the mask has served as the cipher of a subject split between an
external, social and political self and a presupposed internal, natural
substance (bare life), and if that split becomes a practically invisible
caesura guaranteeing a politicality premised on representation and
representability, then I suggest that Agamben’s strategy is to work
towards the perfection of the mask technic, so that any underlying natural
substance may no longer be separated from the mask or political imago.
And if Hobbes had proposed an indistinction between the artifice and
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naturalness of the human which guaranteed the primacy of political
representation, then Agamben emphasises that indistinction to its ‘zero
degree’, to the point of the wholesale preclusion of the ‘natural’ which
inheres in the duality of that distinction. This of course would amount
to the overcoming of the very possibility of a public and private sphere,
which is the aim of Agamben’s notion of a ‘form-of-life’ as a ‘being
that is only its own bare existence and ... being only its form, remains
inseparable from it’ (Agamben 1995: 188). This undoubtedly means,
for Agamben, that a thoroughgoing critique of political representation
is one in which natural life and its ‘representation’ are inseparable,
collapsed into a ‘form’. What begins to ‘disappear’ in Hollis’ Hobbes are
not the techniques and modes of appearance, but the ‘natural substance’
which Agamben argues is actually already invisible, intangible, ‘presupposed’ and, in fact, produced by normative and juridical processes.
Agamben pursues this disappearance, actively arguing for the desubstantialisation of the person and its transformation into, precisely,
a species of image (see ‘Special Being’ in Profanations (2007a)), as the
legal subject is, imperfectly, already.
This de-substantialisation reaches an apotheosis in the new technics
of the person as biometric image. Agamben’s recent discussion of
biometrics proposes that such new technologies radically alter the
basis on which we are known socially: no longer through a function
of the persona, but rather on the basis of an image of something purely
biological (which corresponds to the making of bare life itself into the
political subject) (2009c: 77). Pursuing the evolution of the political
person along an inarrestibly governmental trajectory of political power,
Agamben suggests that the latest biometric technics of identity produce
an ‘identity without person’ (2009c: 79).
Just as it did in Auschwitz, for Agamben modern politics ushers
in the destruction of the person and, along with it, ‘the space of ethics
of which we were used to conceiving’, which now ‘loses its sense and
must be re-thought from the very beginning’ (2009c: 79-80). But
importantly, for Agamben this destruction is also a ‘liberation from
the weight of the person’ (80) and the juridico-morality of its brand
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of ethics. As such, this destruction offers a kind of escape from law’s
juridicality towards an uncertain and inexorable future which is,
for now, governmental in nature. It is through this future, not in its
resistance, that the liberation from ‘personal’ ethics lies. Consistently
with Agamben’s well-known political stance on the politics of the
spectacle and expropriation (see Agamben 2000), he suggests that
since these governmental technics offer no means of return from this
condition, ‘we must prepare ourselves without hope nor recrimination
for the search beyond both personal identity and identity without
persona’ (82). As such, it is my argument that Agamben’s approach is
distinct from both contemporary moral philosophical discourses which
attempt to revive an ethical possibility by ‘deepening the self ’,14 and
critical legal approaches which would attempt to resist the artificiality
of the legal person — or reinvest its responsibility — by thinking it
from the direction of the flesh.15

It is difficult to disagree with the idea that Agamben’s political
project (which aims to critique the very ‘power for action’ as riddled
with juridicality) disables, displaces, or even critiques the kind of
concrete political ‘action for change’ that typically passes for political
engagement. Certainly his work is deliberately without something
like a positive political program. But by foregrounding the question
of Agamben’s orientation to the specific material technics of thought
that are at stake in rethinking the political, it is possible to understand
something like a strategy which he puts into play. Specifically, if I am
correct that Agamben’s work paradoxically perfects the representation
of the person effected by the mask-metaphor, thus becoming syncretic
with the natural person and disabling the possibility of the ‘separation’,
presupposition, representation of that naturalness, then what we must
be prepared to identify in Agamben is actually the delicate achievement
of a new separation. Not, this time, of the person’s externalities from
its presupposed internal life; but, rather, of the juridical relation from
the specific legal technics which engendered it in the first place — a
separation that enables the pitting of the latter against the former.
The perfection of the legal technic of the political image-person
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against its tradition is also, actually, an attempt to ‘hollow out’ the
juridical thought-institution that supports it, thus effecting its collapse.
Perfection and collapse, perfection and ruin: the ruin of law’s traditions
is for Agamben something that comes into view only in the very
moment of their zenith, the era of the nomos of the earth in which the
most imperfect formalisation of the person is in effect.
It would therefore be distinctly possible to view Agamben’s
separation of juridical thought from law, in his treatment of the
juridical technic of the mask, as a concrete example of the enigmatic
notion of ‘neutralizing the partitions of the law’ which he finds in St
Paul (Agamben 2005b: 48). Here on the fundamental ground of the
political category of the person, I argue that Agamben attempts the
perfection and collapse of that juridical person by means of a new
use of its very own technic of the mask, as refined and pushed to an
extreme by modern law. Agamben’s further, extreme development of
this structure bequeathed by law attempts to effect the conditions for
a fulfilment of the legal tradition. Which is to say, he attempts both
to fulfil law and set it aside, and thus ruin it, rendering it inoperative.

Notes
1

2
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The author would like to thank Marett Leiboff for her voice, flexibility,
patience and encouragement, Shaun McVeigh for forcing upon me the
weight of tradition, Timothy Campbell for useful reference suggestions on
an earlier version, two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks, Peter
Rush, and Annee Lawrence. Of course, all errors, strategic miscalculations,
and many omissions, remain mine.
Perhaps the most urgent reference for such a reading would be Roberto
Esposito’s (2007) Terza Persona: Politica della vita e filosofia dell’impersonale,
which poses the ‘person’ as a dispositif which organises and limits life,
but also the much earlier Categorie dell’Impolitico (1999), as Timothy
Campbell’s explanatory essay suggests. Campbell’s (2008) essay also
highlights the significance to Esposito of the contemporary philosophy of
technics, through interpretations of Heidegger (most notably by Bernard
Stiegler, in Technics and Time, through Rousseau rather than Hobbes, both

The Mask and Agamben

3

4
5
6
7

8

9

of whom are united in Categorie dell’Impolitico). It is in this sense that I
use the word ‘technic’.

A similar orientation can be found in Agamben’s investigation of Foucault’s
term dispositif (see Agamben 2009b) especially taken in conjunction with
the extended analysis of the oikonomia of government in Il Regno e la Gloria.
As does Nicholas Heron in his essay ‘The Ungovernable’ (forthcoming
2011)
This is a guiding aim of Esposito’s Categorie dell’Impolitico; but see also
Carlo Galli’s discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy in Spazi Politici (163-4).
See Campbell 2008: 3

For an indication of the depth, breadth and significance of these, see
Esposito’s Categorie dell’Impolitico (1999) which handles in detail many
of the twentieth century’s most important considerations of the political
problem of representation, with particular reference to the German
Catholic tradition.
For discussions and considerations of Hobbes’ political philosophy of
representation, see Skinner (2005), Schmitt (1996a) and to a less direct
but equally thematically powerful extent (1996b), Pitkin (1967), and on
Schmitt’s theory of representation, taking in his reading of Hobbes, Kelly
(2004), as well as Esposito (1999).

While I address this question here only in terms of Agamben’s strategy
for approaching the ‘person’, the general problem of overcoming the
presuppositional structure of language and politics is an old and germane
question in Agamben’s work. See the essays on language in Agamben
(1999) and Daniel Heller-Roazen’s introduction to that volume.

10 For a very different (liberal humanist) approach which nevertheless traces
law’s function in cohering the human person through biological and
symbolic dimensions, see Supiot (2007).

11 The title of the Italian volume of essays roughly equivalent to Potentialities
emblematises this point: La Potenza del Pensiero (The Power of Thought).
While this idea is taken up and developed in many ways within Agamben’s
work, a useful summary of its application here may be borrowed from Alex
Murray and Thanos Zartaloudis’ introduction, itself titled ‘The Power of
Thought’, to a recent edition of Law and Critique: ‘One of the key problems
in legal theories of late modernity … is the juridification of thought as
such. In such juridification the model of thought becomes judgment and
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a legal understanding of responsibility’ (2009: 208). One of Agamben’s
concerns is to demonstrate the capture of thought within a negatively
grounded metaphysical structure and corresponding condition of language
of which, we could say, ‘law’ is perhaps best conceived as a symptom.

12 A specific gesture in response to the notion of representation can be said to
stabilise throughout Agamben’s work, and the argument I offer in this paper
is an example rather than an explanation of it. An important iteration of it
comes from the introduction to Stanzas (1993b), where Agamben construes
the implicit Platonic split between poetry and philosophy as meaning that
‘poetry possesses its object without knowing while philosophy knows its
object without possessing it’. Posing Benjaminian ‘criticism’ against these
options, Agamben says that the critic ‘neither represents nor knows, but
knows the representation’ (xvii). This culminates in Stanzas in a critique
and displacement of signification, which demarcates an important but far
from unique or isolated topos of Agamben’s reconfiguration of the question
of representation (a current which runs through all of Agamben’s works
without exception).

13 It is a striking feature of even — or especially — the most sophisticated
accounts of legal subjectivity from more or less within the legal academy,
that what is continually at issue is the possibility, and specific manner, of
accounting for or mediating the relation between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’
of the subject as a species of mask. See, for example, Goodrich (1991).
14 See Haines (1998)

15 For an interesting and erudite approach in this vein, and a different use
of Agamben, see Mohr (2007) and Mohr (2008).
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